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it is conceivable that the result would be financial disaster to both
the industry and the state. It is suggested that this is the reason that
the legislature saw fit to abrogate that duty.
Florida statute 509.092 has created a conflict between the individual rights and privileges guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment and the economic mandates of the business world. Although
the legislature has expressed its preference by enacting the statute,
the courts must resolve this conflict.
FREDERICK W.

PEIRSOL

INSTRUCTING THE JURY NOT TO CONSIDER INCOME
TAXATION IN PERSONAL INJURY AWARD
The attitude of Americans changes in April of each year. Citizens
who at other times are as patriotic as the American flag curse the
"revenooers" who impose the dreaded income tax. These same citizens
sit on juries that measure damages in personal injury actions. The
fact that jurors consider income taxes when they formulate a damage
award is illustrated by recent cases in which the jury returned from
deliberation to ask the trial judge whether the proceeds of the judgment would be subject to income taxation., A federal district judge
commented in a personal injury suit that jurors consider income taxes
2
when determining damages, especially around the fifteenth of April.
A federal statute provides that damages awarded in a lawsuit on
account of personal injuries or sickness are not subject to income
taxation.3 The existence of this law is probably unknown to most
jurors, and there is a definite possibility that they will add to the
final award in order to compensate the injured party fully. To avoid
this possibility, the trial judge gave the following instruction in
Poirierv. Shireman:4

"'You are instructed that any award made to Plaintiff as
damages in this case, if any is made, is not subject to federal
or state income taxes, and you should not consider such taxes
in fixing the amount of any award made Plaintiff, if any you
make.' "
1. Spencer v. Martin K. Eby Constr. Co., 186 Kan. 345, 350 P.2d 18 (1960);
Crecelius v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 144 Neb. 394, 13 N.W.2d 627 (1944).
2. Anderson v. United Air Lines, Inc., 183 F. Supp. 97 (S.D. Cal. 1960).
3. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §104(a)(2). Federal courts have construed this
section to include awards for loss of earnings because of personal injury or sickness.
McWeeney v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 282 F.2d 34 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364

U.S. 870 (1960).
4.

129 So. 2d 439, 442 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1961), 16 U. MIAMI L. REV. 126.
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The Second District Court of Appeal held the giving of this instruction to be within the court's discretion. Although the Florida
Supreme Court has not listed income taxes among the relevant factors
to be considered in determining damages for personal injuries,5 it has
never faced a case similar to Shireman. This note discusses the propriety of giving the instruction approved in Shireman and considers
several problems arising in connection with it.
THE LAw IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS

In Dempsey v. Thompson, the first case dealing directly with the
point under consideration, the Missouri Supreme Court approved of
the exact instruction given in Shireman:6
"Can there be any sound reason for not so instructing the
jury? We can think of none. Surely, the plaintiff has no right
to receive an enhanced award due to a possible and, we think,
probable misconception on the part of a jury that the amount
allowed by it will be reduced by income taxes. Such an instruction would at once and for all purposes take the subject of income taxes out of the case."
The Missouri court, however, affirmed the decision of the trial
judge, who had refused to give the instruction. The court did so on
the ground that, under the circumstances of the case, refusal to give
the instruction was within the lower court's discretion. Six years
later, the Missouri Supreme Court again affirmed a refusal to give
such an instruction.7 The court held the refusal to be within the discretion of the trial judge because the requested instruction went far
beyond the one approved in Dempsey; however, it indicated that refusal of the approved instruction would constitute an abuse of discretion.
Other states holding an instruction similar to the one given in
Shireman to be properly within the court's discretion are Ohio and
Wisconsin." The United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit has taken the same position, 9 as has a federal district court
in California."
5.
6.
7.
8.

Miami Paper Co. v. Johnston, 58 So. 2d 869 (Fla. 1952).
363 Mo. 339, 346, 251 S.W.2d 42, 45 (1952).
Bowyer v. Te-Co, Inc., 310 S.W.2d 892 (Mo. 1958).
Maus v. New York, C. & St. L.R.R., 165 Ohio St. 281, 285, 135 N.E.2d 253,
256 (1956) (concurring opinion); Behringer v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 6
Wis. 2d 595, 95 N.W.2d 249 (1959).
9. McNVeeney v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 282 F.2d 34 (2d Cir.), cert.

denied, 364 U.S. 870 (1960).
10.

Anderson v. United Air Lines, Inc., 183 F. Supp. 97 (S.D. Cal. 1960).
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A second landmark case in the area is Hall v. Chicago & N.W.
Ry.,"1 in which counsel for the defendant remarked in his closing
statement that any award given to the plaintiff would not be subject
to income tax. The Illinois Supreme Court held this to be error
and stated:

12

"We are of the opinion that the incident of taxation is
not a proper factor for a jury's consideration, imparted either
by oral argument or written instruction. It introduces an extraneous subject, giving rise to conjecture and speculation."
Therefore, even though the question was not before it, the court
specifically pointed out that taxation was an improper subject for
jury instruction. Courts in the following states hold that an instruction similar to the one given in Shireman is improper:1 3 Arizona,
Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Minnesota, Montana,
and Texas. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals 14 and a federal
district court in Iowa 15 hold likewise.
DESIRABILITY OF THE INSTRUCTION

The courts that approve the instruction emphasize the impact of
income taxation on the average juror. These courts feel that the
possibility that jurors will consider income tax in determining the
amount of a personal injury award is sufficient to justify the instruction.6

Most courts that hold the instruction improper do so on the ground
that it introduces an extraneous matter into the jury's consideration.- :
II. 5 Ill. 2d 135, 125 N.E.2d 77 (1955).
12. Id. at 152, 125 N.E.2d at 86.
13. Mitchell v. Emblade, 80 Ariz. 398, 298 P.2d 1034 (1956), 10 U. FLA. L. REv.
98 (1957); Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brown, 93 Ga. App. 805, 92 S.E.2d 874
(1956); Hall v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., supra note 11; Highshew v. Kushto, 235 Ind.
505, 134 N.E.2d 555 (1956); Spencer v. Martin K. Eby Constr. Co., 186 Kan. 345,
350 P.2d 18 (1960); Louisville & N.R.R. v. Mattingly, 318 S.W.2d 844 (Ky. 1958);
Briggs v. Chicago G.W. Ry., 248 Minn. 418, 80 N.W.2d 625 (1957); Bracy v. Great
No. Ry., 136 Mont. 65, 343 P.2d 848 (1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 949 (1960); Missouri, Kan., Tex. R.R. v. McFerrin, 156 Tex. 69, 291 S.W.2d 931 (1956).
14. New York Cent. R.R. v. Delich, 252 F.2d 522 (6th Cir. 1958).
15. Combs v. Chicago St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 135 F. Supp. 750 (N.D. Iowa 1955).
16. McWeeney v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 282 F.2d 34 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 364 U.S. 870 (1960); Anderson v. United Air Lines, Inc., 183 F. Supp. 97
(S.D. Cal. 1960); Dempsey v. Thompson, 363 Mo. 339, 251 S.W.2d 42 (1952); Maus
v. New York C. & St. L.R.R., 165 Ohio St. 281, 285, 135 N.E.2d 253, 256 (1956)
(concurring opinion); Behringer v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 6 Wis. 2d
595, 95 N.W.2d 249 (1959).
17. New York Cent. R.R. v. Delich, 252 F.2d 522 (6th Cir. 1958); Combs v.
Chicago St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 135 F. Supp. 750 (N.D. Iowa 1955); Mitchell v.
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These courts feel that taxation should concern only the taxpayer and
the Government; that it does not concern the jury and therefore
should not be considered in fixing the amount of the award. Such
a conclusion begs the question. The question is not whether juries
should consider taxation but whether they do consider it and should
be instructed not to do so.
One court concludes that the instruction is improper because income taxation is too speculative."" If the jurors are instructed to
ignore income taxation, it is difficult to understand the pertinency
of its speculative nature.
It is submitted that to allow the instruction is the better view.
Jurors are intensely aware of the impact of income taxation. The
possibility of their considering it in determining an award that will
adequately compensate the injured party is sufficient to warrant the
instruction.19 In addition, refusal to give a proper instruction of this
2°
type should always constitute an abuse of the trial court's discretion.
Such a position seems logical because there are no factual variations
among personal injury cases to indicate that the jury will ignore the
2
effect of income taxation in one case and consider it in another. 1
To avoid the possibility of a distorted award, the trial court should
always instruct the jury that the final award is not subject to income
taxation and that they should not consider income taxation at all.
All of the courts that accept the propriety of the instruction have
Emblade, 80 Ariz. 398, 298 P.2d 1034 (1956); Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brown, 93
Ga. App. 805, 92 S.E.2d 874 (1956); Hall v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 5 Ill. 2d 135, 125
N.E.2d 77 (1955); Highshew v. Kushto, 285 Ind. 505, 134 N.E.2d 555 (1956); Louisville & N.R.R. v. Mattingly, 318 S.V.2d 844 (Ky. 1958); Briggs v. Chicago G.W.
Ry., 248 Minn. 418, 80 N.W.2d 625 (1957); Missouri, Kan., Tex. R.R. v. McFerrin,
156 Tex. 69, 291 S.W.2d 931 (1956).
18. Bracy v. Great No. Ry., 136 Mont. 65, 343 P.2d 848 (1959), cert. denied,
361 U.S. 949 (1960).
19. An interesting discussion of this point appears in Anderson v. United
Air Lines, Inc., 183 F. Supp. 97 (S.D. Cal. 1960).
20. This appears to be the position of the Missouri Supreme Court. In
Dempsey v. Thompson, 363 Mo. 339, 251 S.W.2d 42 (1952), it was held that the
instruction should be given in this type of case, but that it would be unjust to
subject the plaintiff to this new ruling. The ruling was prospective only. In
Bowyer v. Te-Co, Inc., 310 S.W.2d 892 (Mo. 1958), the refused instruction went
beyond the one suggested in Dempsey. It encompassed all taxes and warned
the jury not to add to the verdict. The court said: "We are not convinced that
the [trial] court abused its discretion in refusing an instruction broader in its
terms than that suggested in the Dempsey case." Id. at 897. The court clearly
indicated that had the instruction approved in Dempsey been requested, a refusal would have been an abuse of discretion.
21. For a partial discussion of this point, see the dissenting opinion in
McWeeney v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 282 F.2d 34, 40 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
364 U.S. 870 (1960).
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labeled it cautionary. 22 Traditionally, a cautionary instruction is
given at the discretion of the trial judge, who probably knows best
whether it is necessary in order to avoid misleading the jurors.2 3
Thus, all courts have held that the giving of the instruction is within
the trial court's discretion; the Missouri Supreme Court, however, has
indicated that refusal to grant a proper instruction will constitute an
abuse of discretion.24
Loss OF EARNINGS

Certain problems may arise as a result of that portion of the
Shireman instruction stating "you should not consider such taxes in
fixing the amount of any award made Plaintiff, if any you make."
In accordance with this instruction, the jury will neither add to
nor deduct from the final award because of an erroneous belief as
to the injured party's tax liability. In addition, if the jury follows
the broad wording of the instruction, it will not consider income
taxation in determining the amount to be awarded for lost earnings
or the impairment of future earning capacity. In most jurisdictions 25
the second result would comport with the intent of the court that
the jury should not consider income taxation in determining an
award for loss of earnings. This seems to be the correct approach.
An opposite holding would contravert the apparent intent of Congress to confer a tax benefit on the injured party.2 6 The jury would
be taking away that which Congress has given.
Two states27 concur with the English position that only net loss
of earnings should be awarded the injured party.2 8 The rationale
is that damages should place the injured party in the position in
which he would have been had the tort not been committed. Since
actual earnings are taxable and the damages awarded are not, these
states require the jury to deduct probable income tax in determining
loss of earnings.
22. See cases cited note 16 supra.
23. E.g., Hall v. State, 78 Fla. 420, 83 So. 513 (1919); Sapp v. State, 59 Fla.
35, 52 So. 2 (1910); Minor v. State, 55 Fla. 71, 45 So. 816 (1908); Day v. State, 54
Fla. 25, 44 So. 715 (1907).
24. See discussion note 20 supra.
25. E.g., Southern Pac. Co. v. Guthrie, 180 F.2d 295 (9th Cir. 1949), cert.
denied, 341 U.S. 904 (1951); Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. Curl, 178 F.2d 497 (8th Cir.
1949); Wagner v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 7 Ill. App. 2d 445, 129 N.E.2d 771 (1955);
John F. Buckner 9- Sons v. Allen, 289 S.W.2d 387 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956).
26. Hall v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 5 IIl. 2d 135, 125 N.E.2d 77 (1955). But see
Morris & Nordstrom, Personal Injury Recoveries 6- the Federal Income Tax Law,
46 A.B.A.J. 274 (1960).
27. Floyd v. Fruit Indus., Inc., 144 Conn. 659, 136 A.2d 918 (1957); Magnolia
Petroleum Co. v. Sutton, 208 Okla. 488, 257 P.2d 307 (1953).
28. British Transp. Comm'n v. Gourley, [1955] 2 Weekly L.R. 41 (H.L.).
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NO TES

No Florida court has held directly on this point. Two factors
indicate, however, that the Shireman case may support the position
that jurors may not consider income tax liability in computing loss
of earnings. First, the instruction given in Shireman is identical to
the one approved in Dempsey, in which the court held that probable
taxes should not be deducted in determining an award for loss of
income. Second, the complaint in Shireman contained a count for
loss of earnings sustained, 29 and the court did not limit the language
of the instruction to the final award.
In a jurisdiction following the minority view, the Shireman instruction will have to be limited to the final award, and an additional
instruction will have to be given concerning the matter of income tax
liability in the determination of loss of earnings.
PUNITIVE DAMAGES

Another problem arises in those cases in which the jury may
award punitive damages, that is, in those causes of action based on
intentional torts or acts of the defendant that are so willful or
grossly negligent as to indicate a wanton disregard of the rights of
others. 3° Punitive damages awarded in such a case are subject to
federal income taxation. 31 Some trial courts may desire to indicate
this exception to the jury if the Shireman instruction is given. But
this exception need not be noted in Florida courts, which hold that
the primary purpose of punitive damages is not to benefit the plaintiff but to punish the defendant.3 2 The degree of the punishment
should not vary with the plaintiff's tax liability. The plaintiff's award
should not be increased to compensate for the taxation of punitive
damages. This result will be achieved under the basic instruction.
In most jurisdictions it is possible for the jury to award a single
sum for both compensatory and punitive damages.3 3 A recent revenue
ruling indicates that the portion of this sum awarded as punitive
damages is taxable. 34 The ruling suggests that this portion can be
determined by applying the percentage of the claim requested as
punitive damages to the final award. Thus, if the plaintiff sought
$50,000 compensatory damages and $25,000 punitive damages but
29. Poirier v. Shireman, 129 So. 2d 439 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1961).
30. E.g., Carraway v. Revell, 116 So. 2d 16 (Fla. 1959); Ross v. Gore, 48 So.
2d 412 (Fla. 1950); Sauer v. Sauer, 128 So. 2d 761 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1961).
31. Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955).
22. E.g., Carraway v. Revell, supra note 20; Dr. P. Phillips 8 Sons, Inc. v.
Kilgore, 152 Fla. 578, 12 So. 2d 465 (1943); Sauer v. Sauer, supra note 20.
33. E.g., Albert v. Miami Transit Co., 154 Fla. 186, 17 So. 2d 89 (1944);
MCCORMICK, DAMAGES 295 (1935).

34.

Rev. Rul. 418, 1958-2 Cum. BULL. 18.
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